Antoine Niedergang

Towards the taxation of LEO activities?

Could we tax LEO activities, could we move towards the taxation of LEO activities? We thought that this could be a good point of focus for this new Space Law article on Space Legal Issues. In preamble, it is important to recall that Article I of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (entered into force on October 10, 1967) states that “The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigation”.

As human expansion into outer space continues to develop, the obstacles arising could be an amplification of issues already present in taxing the digital economy. According to that principle, access to outer space should be “free”. Private entities can freely use outer space only if they have been authorised by their State (Article VI of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty declares that “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty”).

According to the first article of the Magna Carta of space law, the majority of authors believe that no State can effectively and rightfully deny access to outer space to another State. This principle is enshrined as one of the funding principles of Space Law and can be considered being well established in the minds. Moreover, this concept is often put forward by States wishing to use space as a source of strategic information on State activities. Thus, overflight of the territory of a State by a reconnaissance satellite is, in principle, free and allowed. It raises one question that, with the acceleration of the New Space era, might become a true dilemma: f space activities are completely free, how can total saturation of orbits (especially the LEO one) be avoided?

Taxation of LEO activities seems to be a solution. The appropriate model could be the following one: if a State A wants to launch a satellite or a constellation of satellites, it will have to pay X depending on the orbit (and how already saturated and used the orbit is), the size of the space object or the number of space objects, and finally and why not, depending on its intended purposes (whether scientific, commercial, military…). Thus, two main principles collide, the first being that of the freedom to use outer space with that of the taxation of LEO activities. The use of satellites is the most prominent example of space technology from which issues arise for tax authorities. The nebulous nature of these services makes it difficult to determine the appropriate measures for taxation.

Faced with such an important problem, the general interest should first be concerned. Doesn’t Humanity have an interest in using outer space, and should it not be allowed to do such according to the principles enacted in the Public International Space Law of the 1960s and 1970s? But how to concede that freedom with the multiplication of orbital activities? Indeed, the taxation of LEO activities could allow a better control, a better regulation. Today, space is beginning to be in a critical situation to the point of being qualified as a landfill by some specialists. Satellites must change paths to avoid collisions with airspeeds. In April 2019, the International Space Station (ISS) itself had to change course due to the destruction of a satellite by an Indian missile (ASAT).

This saturation threatens exploration missions, and there is a non-zero risk that one day, it may not be possible anymore to consider the use of the Moon or Mars, or any other destination in outer space. However, and this is the second important principle, a major problem appears on the question of who will tax space activities and what will that money be used for?

It is possible to envisage a supra-state organisation, like the United Nations, grouping together the States capable of using outer space. A tax would then be created and apply to any outer space activity, or maybe in a first time to LEO activities only. This tax could be seen as a tool used to both regulate and control. This tax could concern both public and private entities and only apply to commercial activities. The money generated by the taxation of LEO activities could be used for example to finance research and “clean” Earth orbits from space debris.

Economic theory identifies relatively restrictively the so-called “market failures” cases where the market left to itself does not allow to reach the optimal situation and where the intervention of the public authorities is then justified: the existence of barriers to entry, natural monopoly, external effects, public goods, guardianship goods, or even information asymmetries. In France, public intervention has historically resulted in the direct production of public goods by the administration, then by companies owned by the State, particularly in the network sectors (post, telecommunications, rail transport, electricity…). However, government action can itself lead to shortcomings (notably due to information asymmetries), bureaucratic red tape or capture by pressure groups. Since the 1980s, public action has gradually shifted from direct production to sector regulation; at the same time, the sectors previously characterised by public monopolies have been opened up to competition. Although reduced, the State shareholder had to, to avoid conflicts of interest, entrust the regulation to more or less independent authorities: Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (ART), created in 1997, which became Electronic Communications Regulatory Authority and Posts (ARCEP) in 2005, when the postal sector opened; Railways Regulatory Authority created in 2009, which became Railways and Roads Regulatory Authority (ARAFER) in 2015, following the opening of passenger road transport to competition; Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), created in 2010 when the energy market opened up; Online Gaming Regulatory Authority (ARJEL), created in 2010 to support the liberalisation of online games. The State is also involved in the regulation of certain goods and services markets such as those served by the regulated professions (price regulation, market entry…).

A wide variety of public interventions of a generally sectoral nature are often called “regulation”, ranging from strictly economic actions (prices, quantities) to the rules of ethics that apply to a profession or the protection of privacy. All of these interventions, whether economic or not, can affect the functioning of markets. It could be interesting to work on a system for the taxation of LEO activities operated by an international organisation such as the United Nations (U.N.).

The Export Administration Regulations

The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are a set of regulations administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security, which is part of the U.S. Commerce Department. In general, the EAR govern what a person may export from the U.S., re-export the item from a foreign country, or transfer an item from one person to another, in a foreign country. The EAR apply to physical things (sometimes referred to as “commodities”) as well as technology and software.

The Export Administration Regulations have very broad application. With only the exceptions noted below, the EAR apply to the following categories of things: all items in the United States of America, including in a U.S. Foreign Trade Zone or moving in transit through the United States of America from one foreign country to another, all U.S. origin items wherever located, foreign-made commodities that incorporate controlled U.S.-origin commodities, foreign-made commodities that are “bundled” with controlled U.S.-origin software, foreign-made software that is commingled with controlled U.S.-origin software, and foreign-made technology that is commingled with controlled U.S.-origin technology in certain quantities (see the “de minimis” rules).

The Export Administration Regulations also apply to the following categories of items: certain foreign-made direct products of U.S. origin technology or software, and certain commodities produced by any plant or major component of a plant located outside the United States of America that is a direct product of U.S.-origin technology or software.

The Export Administration Regulations does not apply, however, to items that are exclusively controlled for export or re-export by the following departments and agencies of the U.S. Government which regulate exports or re-exports for national security or foreign policy purposes: prerecorded phonograph records reproducing in whole or in part, the content of printed books, pamphlets, and miscellaneous publications, including newspapers and periodicals, printed books, pamphlets, and miscellaneous publications including bound newspapers and periodicals, children’s picture and painting books, newspaper and periodicals, unbound, excluding waste, music books, music sheets, calendars and calendar blocks, paper, maps, hydrographical charts, atlases, gazetteers, globe covers, and globes (terrestrial and celestial), exposed and developed microfilm reproducing, in whole or in part, the content of any of the above, exposed and developed motion picture film and soundtrack, and advertising printed matter exclusively related thereto.

The Export Administration Regulations contain a list of rules called “The 10 General Prohibitions”, which provide as follow:

1. You may not, without a license or License Exception, export any item subject to the EAR to another country or re-export any item of U.S.-origin if each of the following is true: “(i) The item is controlled for a reason indicated in the applicable Export Control Classification Number (ECCN), and (ii) Export to the country of destination requires a license for the control reason as indicated on the Country Chart at part 738 of the EAR”.

2. You may not, without a license or license exception, re-export or export from abroad foreign-made commodities that incorporate controlled U.S.-origin commodities, foreign-made commodities that are “bundled” with controlled U.S.-origin software, foreign-made software that is commingled with controlled U.S.-origin software, or foreign-made technology that is commingled with controlled U.S.-origin technology, if such items require a license according to any of the provisions in the EAR and incorporate or are commingled with more than a de minimis amount of controlled U.S. content, as defined in part 734 of the EAR.

3. General Prohibition 3 applies to certain items that are produced outside of the U.S. and that are the “direct product” of U.S. technology or software, or they are developed from a plat which is the “direct product” of U.S. technology or software. Under General Prohibition 3, you may not, without a license or license exception, re-export any item that meets the direct product test to a destination in Country Group D:1, E:1, or E:2, as defined in part 740 of the EAR. Additionally, you may not, without a license or license exception, re-export or export from abroad any foreign-made military commodities that meet the direct product test to a destination in Country Group D:1, D:3, D:4, D:5, E:1, or E:2.

4. You may not take any action that is prohibited by a denial order issued under 15 CFR Part 766. These orders prohibit many actions in addition to direct exports by the person denied export privileges, including some transfers within a single country, either in the United States of America or abroad, by other persons. You are responsible for ensuring that any of your transactions in which a person who is denied export privileges is involved do not violate the terms of the order. Orders denying export privileges are published in the Federal Register when they are issued and are the legally controlling documents in accordance with their terms.

5. You may not, without a license, knowingly export or re-export any item subject to the EAR to an end-user or end-use that is prohibited by part 744 of the EAR.

6. You may not, without a license or License Exception authorised under part 746, export or re-export any item subject to the EAR to any of the following countries: Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, Russia (with respect to Russian oil and gas industries), Crimea region of the Ukraine, Iran and Syria.

7. U.S. persons may not perform certain activities relating to nuclear explosive devices, missiles, and chemical or biological weapons.

8. Under General Prohibition 8, if you export or re-export an item, it may not pass through any of the following countries without a license: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cambodia, Cuba, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

9. You may not violate terms or conditions of a license or of a License Exception issued under or made a part of the EAR, and you may not violate any order issued under or made a part of the EAR.

10. You may not sell, transfer, export, re-export, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, store, use, loan, dispose of, transport, forward, or otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item subject to the EAR and exported or to be exported with knowledge that a violation of the Export Administration Regulations, the Export Administration Act or any order, license, License Exception, or other authorisation issued thereunder has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to occur in connection with the item. Nor may you rely upon any license or License Exception after notice to you of the suspension or revocation of that license or exception.

Nicaragua v. United States

In the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America, concerning military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua, the Court had first to make a judgement on its jurisdiction. On November 26, 1984, the United States Government has invoked a number of reasons for trying to escape international justice.

We know that the submission to the procedure before the Court and to its decision’s rests for each State on a voluntary act. This approach commits the State which engages itself to accept the jurisdiction of the Court in any lawsuit with another State having acted in the same way. But each State may accompany certain reservations with its declaration of acceptance of the jurisdiction. Thus, the United States of America had stated that it excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court “disputes arising from a multilateral treaty, unless all the parties to the treaty which the decision concerns also were parties to the case submitted to the courtyard”.

Nicaragua, in its Application, relied on the violation by the United States of America of obligations contained in both the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), two texts which are multilateral treaties. But other Central American states could be considered as concerned by the decision. The United States of America therefore argued in the first part of the case that the Court lacked jurisdiction.

These pleadings were an opportunity for them to give their arguments: incompetence of the Court since the law applicable according to the applicant’s own request was withdrawn from the field of jurisdiction by the American reserve. Incompetence also, because the problems of the use of force and of collective self-defense have political and military aspects that fall outside the jurisdiction of a court. By carefully reserving all substantive issues, the Court in 1984 rejected these arguments and positively decided the question of its jurisdiction.

The judgement rendered on the merits and motivated in one hundred and forty-two pages, is a perilous and rather fascinating exercise of balance and cautious subtlety. The operative part has sixteen points, decided by eleven votes to four, or for the most part twelve to three or fourteen to one. In its drafting, it reflects the difficult but not impossible coherence of a Court formed of jurists as diverse in their cultures, their temperaments, their formations, their ideologies. The result is a clear condemnation of U.S. actions in Central America.

The Court recognises that El Salvador is a State concerned which could be “affected” by the decision but is not a party to the case. It therefore admits the application of the American reserve, but it does so strictly. This reservation prevents it, of course, from basing its decision on the Charter of the United Nations or that of the OAU. But this does not prevent it from using other sources of law: customary international law and general imperative law (jus cogens). Strongly rooted socially, these sources of law, unaccompanied by the formalism by which treaties express the will of the States, are of an authenticity guaranteed by other factors of acceptance, tacit factors that it belongs to the judge to identify.

It is on the basis of this law that the Court has condemned the (multiple) violations committed by the United States of America against international legality: “violations of the principles of non-intervention, non-use of force and sovereignty of another State, by training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the Contras; attacking Puerto Sandino, Corinto, Potosí, San Juan del Sur; by flying over the territory of Nicaragua, laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of Nicaragua”, “encouragement to commit acts contrary to the general principles of humanitarian law, producing in 1983 a manual entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare”.

If the phrase of June 27, 1986, with few exceptions, did not have all the echoes it deserves in the mainstream press, it is because the United States Government, its allies and all ideological apparatus that serves them are sought after by this judgement and want to downplay the scope for two reasons. On the one hand, it reveals that certain fundamental legal principles are unavoidable; on the other hand, in the contemporary ideological confusion and the war of information, the Court appears by this decision as the indispensable organ of objectivation of the situations because it operates the necessary qualifications of the facts.

The United States of America, failing in the proceedings on the merits, had thought that it could guarantee itself against any application of the law which was condemned to have been sustained, initially, the Court’s incompetence for various reasons, among those who been applying their reserve. But they claimed to be yet another source of the law was not applicable by the Hague jurisdiction to this dispute because, in matters of recourse to armed force (and this is what it is about “the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter summarize and supersede the principles of general and customary international law in this field”).

The evasion of the greatest world power before the application of the law is consumed. This terrible disregard of the basic text that underpins contemporary international society: the United Nations Charter, and the desire to extend this exclusion to the whole of international law, are in line with the change in the attitude of States with regard to the United Nations system, illustrated in particular by their withdrawal from UNESCO.

Allergic to the international legality, products of a democratic mechanism in which all the States of the world participate, the United States of America knows that there will not be an honest jurist to justify their actions in Central America by maintaining that Nicaragua, a small a country of three million inhabitants, economically weak, military threatens the American giant. And they are choosing, through a procedural mechanism, to paralyse the application of fundamental texts.

The Court accepts the paralysis imposed, but demonstrates its vitality and the vitality of the law by refusing to extend this paralysis to other sources of international law. And, in doing so, it opens a small skylight on hope. For, under the neutral terms of the jurists’ memoirs, the American arguments led to the end of hope: if the Court cannot rely on the Charter, it cannot rely on any other rule of law, and if it cannot entertain grievances relating to the unlawful use of armed force (because these grievances are the sole responsibility of other bodies, that is to say the Security Council, where the crippling virus is called a veto), then, when the force of arms sets out, there is no room for the law.

The judgement of June 27, 1986 refuses that. Law is the social institution whose purpose, when not deviated, is to regulate, limit or even eliminate the use of force. As a result, the years of debate within the specialised committees are not entirely useless in order to build up international law in stone, to determine how the commitment of States is expressed, to refine the principle of good faith, to give a definition of aggression, build a humanitarian law.

Principles as fundamental as the respect of the sovereignty of a State, the prohibition of the use of the force (except case of self-defense carefully identified), the prohibition of the intervention in the affairs of a State, the inviolability of the territory, were all constructed as norms of international law by the will of the States expressed not only in the form of certain treaties duly signed and ratified, but also by adherence to an international custom: the result of State attitudes (precedents) accompanied by acceptance of the norm (opinio juris).

The affirmation of the existence of this custom in the recent judgement clarifies the question of voluntarism for the greater good of international law. It is true, and it cannot be otherwise, that international law is the result of the will of States; but there can be no confusion between the will of the State, the mature fruit of social consciousness, and the caprices of a changing political will, the excess of voluntarism which would reduce international law to almost nothing. What the deep will of the people of the United States of America has forged over decades, and in agreement with other peoples, as the basic norms of the democratic functioning of international society, the current United States Government cannot remove it by playing a reserve.

Finally, it is interesting to find in the writings of international judges the remark that “while the United States of America can certainly make its own assessment of the human rights situation in Nicaragua, the use of force cannot be the appropriate method for verifying and ensuring compliance with these rights”. And to respond to the United States of America, which sees the excessive militarisation of Nicaragua as proof of its aggressive aims, the Court retorts that “it is irrelevant and useless to take a position on this allegation that there are no rules in international law other than those which the State concerned may accept, by treaty or otherwise, imposing the limitation of the level of armaments of a sovereign State, this principle being valid for all States without distinction”.

Lex generalis and lex specialis

In international relations and more specifically in space law, issues of general law and special law, or lex generalis and lex specialis, are recurrent. Lex specialis is a Latin phrase which means “law governing a specific subject matter”. It comes from the legal maxim “lex specialis derogat legi generali”. This doctrine relates to the interpretation of laws. It can apply in both domestic and international law contexts.

Lex generalis, the general law

The expression lex generalis refers, literally, to the “general law”. All countries have their own definition of what is the “general law”, according to the subjects studied in domestic law. It represents a general rule, a general frame, which applies in each area. International law governs the relations between the subjects of this legal system, which are States and international organizations; so two things appear: the subjects of general law, but also the sources of general law.

A subject of international law is subject to this lex generalis and must be able to rely on it. Originally, states were the only subject of public international law. But this conception is long gone, although original subjects, states have felt since 1815 the necessity of grouping themselves in international organizations which have gradually reached the status of subjects. On April 11, 1949, an opinion of the International Court of Justice stated that: “The subjects of law in a legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights and their nature depends on the needs of the community”.

It is also noted that the individual has taken an increasingly important place in the system of international law, because of the protection of human rights. There are three major players in international law: the state in international law, international organizations, and individuals in international law. There is no code of public international law as such, and no hierarchy between different sources, whether written or not. This may be one of the consequences of the non-existence of an established international legal order, despite the near omnipresence of the United Nations in world conflicts.

The various sources of international law are mentioned in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, that only the parties bound by the decision in any particular case, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”.

From this aforementioned principle, two sources can be removed: the unwritten sources of custom, general principles of law and equity, and the written sources of state treaties, international organizations, and international courts and tribunals.

Lex specialis, the specific law

The purpose of lex specialis (a Latin phrase which means “law governing a specific subject matter”) is to fill the gaps in general law. The scope of the special right or law is, by definition, narrower than that of general law. Thus, it will concern a very specific area such as the law of the sea, the law of the environment or the law of space. The importance of a special regime often lies in the way in which its norms express a unique object and purpose. Thus, their interpretation and application should, as far as possible, translate this object and purpose.

In space law, more specifically, there are five major international texts: the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”, the “Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space”, the “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects”, the “Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space”, and the “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”. Besides these international conventions are the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, or multilateral international agreements.

The articulation of the general and specific law

As previously seen, concerning the articulation of lex generalis and lex specialis, international law is a legal system. Its rules and principles (its norms) operate in relation to other rules and principles, and should be interpreted in the context of the latter. As a legal system, international law is not a random accumulation of such norms. There are significant relationships between these standards. These can therefore occupy a hierarchical level more or less high, their formulation can be more or less general or specific, and their validity can be recent or long. In the application of international law, it is often necessary to determine the exact relationship between two or more rules and principles that are both valid and applicable in relation to a situation. For this purpose, the relevant relationships fall into two general categories.

Interpreting relationships: this is the case when one standard helps the interpretation of another. A standard may assist with the interpretation of another standard if it serves, for example, to apply, specify, update or modify it. In such a situation, both standards are applied together.

Conflict relations: this is the case when two standards that are both valid and applicable lead to inconsistent decisions, so a choice must be made between these standards. The basic rules concerning the resolution of normative conflicts are contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

When seeking to determine mutual relations between two or more standards, these standards should be interpreted in accordance with, or by analogy with, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in particular the provisions of Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 33 relating to the interpretation of treaties). It is generally agreed that when several standards relate to a single issue, they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted in such a way as to reveal a single set of compatible obligations.

The Latin maxim “lex specialis derogat legi generali”, which means “Special law repeals general laws”, is a generally accepted method of interpreting and resolving conflicts in both domestic and international law. It means that whenever two or more standards deal with the same subject, priority should be given to the most specific standard. This principle can be applied in several contexts: between provisions contained in a single treaty, between provisions in two or more treaties, between a conventional standard and an unconventional standard, as well as between two unconventional standards. The source of the norm (whether conventional, customary or a general principle of law) is not decisive in determining the most specific standard. In practice, however, treaties often function as lex specialis in relation to customary law and general principles. This is what can be said concerning lex generalis and lex specialis.

Who was Eilene Galloway?

Doctor Eilene Galloway (May 4, 1906 – May 2, 2009), nicknamed “the Great lady of space”, is a founding member of NASA and has worked for the creation of space law. She has made international space cooperation her spearhead. She has been recognized by her peers as one of the greatest experts in this field.

Dr. Eilene Galloway was born on May 4, 1906 in Kansas City, Missouri. Her father joined the Marines in 1915, and her mother raised her alone. In 1923, Eilene graduated from Westport High School in Kansas City, Missouri, where she was twice captain of the “discussion team”. She later attended Washington University in St. Louis, and Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania, and moved to the District of Columbia with her husband, George Barnes Galloway, in 1931.

During the Great Depression, Eilene worked for the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. She wrote an adult education guide first distributed in almost two thousand copies. After pressuring the publisher (The Washington Post), the guide was printed in greater numbers, allowing a better distribution which allowed the sale of nearly two hundred thousand copies.

Eilene Galloway began her career with the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress in 1941. From there, she thought, researched, and wrote on many topics for the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives, such as an essay on “Guided Missiles in Foreign Countries” in 1957. Her career then took a different turn when the United States Senate asked her to write a report on the launch of Sputnik 1 (Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite, was launched by the Soviet Union in 1957), and its impact on the United States of America.

Eilene Galloway was sole responsible for the section on international cooperation of the National Aeronautics and Space Act; signed by U.S.A. President Dwight Eisenhower on July 29, 1958. The section was written as follows: “The Administration, under the foreign policy guidance of the President, may engage in a program of international cooperation in work done pursuant to this Act, and in the peaceful application of the results thereof, pursuant to agreements made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate”. This text gave birth to the American space agency; she was also responsible for the change of meaning of NASA, which became “National Aeronautics and Space Administration”.

In the 1960s, Eilene Galloway represented the United States of America in the drafting of treaties governing the exploration and use of outer space, thus contributing to the launch of the field of International Space Law. “The Great lady of space” has worked for several decades in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and has also been invested in the establishment of the International Institute of Space Law (IISL), an independent non-governmental organisation dedicated to fostering the development of space law. She was vice-president of the Institute between 1967 and 1979, later becoming the honorary director of the Institute. She received the Andrew Haley Gold Medal in 1968, and the Lifetime Achievement Award from IISL in 1990.

Eilene Galloway received a NASA Public Service Award in 1984 “for outstanding achievements as a Congressional Adviser on the Legal and Technical Aspects of Outer Space and for Services Provided to the United Nations and to other international organizations with a view to contributing to the creation of a rational basis for the international space”. In 1987, she was the first recipient of the Women in Aerospace Award of Excellence for all of her accomplishments.

In 1999, Eilene Galloway received the flag and crew emblems of the International Space Station, “in appreciation for serving the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the nation as a member of the Advisory Committee on the International Space Station, and for the invaluable contribution in making the dream a reality”. On its behalf, the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) has created the Eilene Galloway Award for Best Written Submission to the Manfred Lachs Space Law Advocacy Competition from 2000 and, since 2006, to the Eilene Galloway Symposium on Critical Issues of space law.

In March 2009, Eilene Galloway wrote an article entitled Space Law for a Moon-Mars Program, published in Space News. Her vision of the law of space is strong and interesting, because it shows that space ambitions do not diminish over time and far from it, increase. It shows that international cooperation on the law of space is one of the most important things to get back to the Moon or go to Mars. Eilene Galloway worked at IISL until her death; the President Emeritus of the Society, Isabella Diederiks-Verschoor paid her last tribute: “She has lived a life of distinguished service in the United States of America and the world of space, and has been a source of inspiration for all of us and above all, a reliable friend”.

I first met Eilene Galloway when I was just beginning my work on space law. She graciously welcomed me into her home and we talked for a very long time. I was impressed by how genuine she was and that she, who had accomplished so much, was willing to spend time with a novice in the field. My condolences to Jonathan and to the rest of your family” – Colleen M. Driscoll, The Kurtz Institute of Peacemaking.

Dr. Galloway’s contribution to international law, and international space law in particular, has been a remarkable achievement. Her fruitful and dedicated work in this area, as well as training and encouraging of young professionals, earned her world-wide recognition and respect from specialists all over the world. Her presence will be sorely missed” – Mazlan Othman, The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA).

I offer my warmest condolences to all of Eilene Galloway’s family. She has been and will always remain a doctrinal beacon for me as for many jurists. Reading her thoughts and her efforts to develop space law was for me a remarkable example. Because her ideas will continue to live and grow, Eilene Galloway does not really leave us” – Mireille Couston.